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1 Introduction
How important are common world-wide technology shocks for fluctuations in real
exchange rates? The aim of this paper is to address this issue in the context of the
real euro-dollar rate, using a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach with
long-run restrictions.
The empirical literature on real exchange rates has long sought to identify those
disturbances that are the primal source behind their movements. In a seminal paper,
Clarida and Gali (1994) use long-run restrictions a` la Blanchard and Quah (1989) to
identify relative supply, demand and nominal shocks. They find that supply shocks
- identified as the only disturbance that can permanently change the level of output
in the long-run - have in general a very small contribution to the variance of the
forecast error of real exchange rates at horizons between 1-20 quarters but shocks to
(real) demand appear to be the most influential factor. Farrant and Peersman (2006)
e↵ectively repeat Clarida and Gali (1994) exercise using sign restrictions as their
identification method. They conclude that the important role of demand shocks in
explaining real exchange rate movements is significantly reduced and nominal shocks
appear to be much more relevant. In line with Clarida and Gali (1994), they still
find that supply shocks are the least influential factor; despite that their e↵ect now
appears to be significantly higher - for the EA-US relative price measure this ranges
between 12-28% at horizons up to five years. Lewis (2006) also uses sign restrictions
to identify productivity shocks, whose contribution to the variance of the forecast
error in the real euro-dollar rate does not exceed 10%. On the other hand, Lastrapes
(1992) finds an important contribution of “real” shocks to exchange rate movements,
but his approach cannot distinguish between di↵erent types of real shocks. Further,
Alquist and Chinn (2002), using cointegration techniques, and Schnatz et al (2003),
using a general equilibrium model as a measuring device, suggest that productivity
di↵erences can be a significant source of variations in relative prices between US and
Europe.
This paper extends the empirical SVAR-literature that seeks to identify sources of
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variations in real exchange rates. We use an SVAR model with long-run restrictions
to identify a common stochastic trend in productivity, interpreted as a “permana-
nent world technology shock”. In this respect, our paper is new in many (related)
ways. First, we emphasise on technology shocks, that is innovations that can perma-
nently change the level of productivity, as opposed to shocks to the labour input as
it is common in the literature1. Second, and most important, is our definition of a
permanent technology shock: a common stochastic trend in productivity processes
that constitutes the only source of unit-root. In other words, we assume, and test
using statistical techniques, that productivity processes are one-to-one cointegrated.
Rabanal et al (2008) show that the latter cannot be rejected at conventional confi-
dence levels. Armed with this result, they use an estimated bivariate Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) process for EA and US with a cointegrating vector (1  1) as the
exogenous driving force of a standard, two-country DSGE model to show that they
can match the observed real exchange rate volatility relative to output; when conven-
tional International Business Cycle (IBC) models with stationary TFP processes do
not (Backus et al 1994, Heathcote and Perri 2002). Bringing the common stochas-
tic trend to productivity in the empirical SVAR literature that seeks factors of real
exchange rate movements constitutes the main contribution of this paper. The im-
portance of such a disturbance as a source of cyclical fluctuations in an open-economy
context is also highlighted in Dupaigne and Fe`ve (2009). They find that aggregate
employment can increase in response to a world technology shock; thus casting doubts
on Gali’s (1999) famous result that employment decreases in the short-run after such
an impulse. As they explain, this way of identifying permanent technology improve-
ments - i.e. by using cointegrated productivities - is more immune to country-specific
stationary disturbances and allows for open-economy dynamics. We use cointegrated
productivities as a tool for identifying the “permanent world technology shock”. To
the extent that permanent common technology shocks are large in magnitude, and to
the extend that technology is used di↵erently across countries, they will have e↵ects
1Note that shocks to the labour input can permanently change output and hours worked, but
not labour productivity in the long-run. For a clear exposition see Gali (1999).
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on macroeconomic variables at business cycle frequencies. Finally, our emphasis on
a common permanent component in productivity meets a vast literature seeking to
identify common factors in international cyclical movements (see for example Canova
et al 2007, Kose et al 2003, Stock and Watson 2005)2.
We estimate a SVAR model with US productivity growth, EA-US productiv-
ity di↵erentials and the real euro-dollar exchange rate using annual data from the
EU-KLEMS database from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre of the
University of Groningen, for the period 1970-2007. We extract information about
possibly several types of structural disturbances, but we are able to properly iden-
tify only one of them, namely a permanent world technology shock. Identification is
achieved using the approach pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and employed
by Shapiro and Watson (1988), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), Ahmed et al (1993)
and others. An important advantage of this approach is that we do not have to im-
pose any restrictions on the dynamics. Rather, we use long-run restrictions which are
in general less controversial (Ahmed et al 1993); even though their empirical validity
has often been questioned (Farrant and Perrsman 2006).
From our analysis we derive two major conclusions. First, analysis of impulse
responses suggests an important role of productivity for di↵erences in relative prices
across the Atlantic, even though the stochastic trend is common. Temporarily higher
productivity in the US causes the dollar to appreciate significantly, and the e↵ect is
rather persistent. Our results are in line with Alquist and Chinn (2002) and Schnatz
et al (2003) and provide further evidence for the existence of a Balassa-Samuelson type
of e↵ect in the euro-dollar rate, that might stem even from technology shocks that are
common. This sustains the theoretical possibility that productivity improvements can
induce wealth e↵ects that are so large, that eventually outweigh supply-side e↵ects
and result in an increase in the relative price. Second, the world technology shock
contributes more than 70% to the variance of the forecast error of US productivity
2Typically, factor models do not give any indications on what these factors are leaving one
hungry for economic insights. However, Crucini et al (2008) find that productivity constitutes the
main driving variable for the common component of the business cycle among the G-7; explaining
around 47% of the common factor.
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on impact, and less to the variability of di↵erences in labour productivity across the
Atlantic (around 25% at all horizons) but fails to be the dominant source of real-
exchange rate fluctuations. Nevertheless, its contribution is still significant standing
at 15.7% on impact and slightly more than one-fifth at business-cycle frequencies.
Checks for robustness support this outcome, except for the case where the proxy for
the real exchange rate is included in first-di↵erences in our SVAR. These results do
not contrast Clarida and Gali (1994) and others since the residual variability, around
80%, is explained by other factors, possibly demand-oriented, but disturbances that
can permanently change productivity cannot be among them. The paper that is most
similar to ours is Ahmed et al (1993) in so far that they identify and quantify the
e↵ects of a world supply shock (among other shocks) using long-run restrictions in
a SVAR system for the US and a five-nation OECD aggregate. Since both output
and employment are used in their SVAR system, this disturbance is similar to ours
but we concentrate on the real euro-dollar rate. In comparison, the world supply
shock is found to be a bit less significant; it explains around 10% of the variation in
their measure of relative price but the contribution of country-specific shocks is a bit
higher (16.9%). Their results are also in line to Clarida and Gali (1994) in so far that
permanent demand shocks are dominant for variations in relative prices.
The next section describes the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology employed
and our identifying restrictions. Section III discusses data and stationarity issues and
Section IV provides the results. Some tests for robustness are done in Section V and
section VI concludes.
2 Methodology
In this section we describe the Blanchard and Quah (1989) approach and how it can
be fitted to our case. We impose - and confirm using statistical tests - that the log of
US productivity (XUSt ) is non-stationary in levels but stationary in first di↵erences,
whereas the other two variables of our system - log of EA-US productivity di↵erentials
(XEAt   XUSt ) and the log of the real euro-dollar exchange rate (qt) are stationary
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processes. We assume that there can be many disturbances in the economy, and our
main identifying restriction that only one of them can have a permanent e↵ect on the
level of productivity allows us to extract information about the “world technology
shock”.
Letting Y = ( XUSt , X
EA
t  XUSt , qt)0 be the vector of endogenous variables and
" = ("wt , v
1
t , v
2
t )
0 be the vector of the world technology shock and two other unidenti-
fied shocks; then under standard regularity conditions each variable can be uniquely
represented as an infinite distributed lag of these disturbances:
Yt = A0"t + A1"t 1 + A2"t 2 + ... (1)
A0 is the matrix of contemporaneous e↵ects of the shocks on the endogenous
variables, and thereafter Ai8i   1 represent the e↵ects at subsequent lags. The
assumption that the shocks are uncorrelated implies that the variance-covariance
matrix is diagonal, hence the assumption that var(") = I3 is a simple normalisation.
Our restriction that only the world technology shock can have a permanent e↵ect
on productivity implies that the second and third elements of the first rows of the
sequence of Ai matrices sum up to zero:
1X
i=0
↵12i = 0 (2)
1X
i=0
↵13i = 0 (3)
For full identification, we need the long-run matrix to be lower-triangular. Thus,
we need to impose a further restriction that the third element of the second row of
the series of matrices Ai also sum to zero. Note that this restriction has no economic
meaning since by stationarity of the di↵erentials series; no shock can have a permanent
e↵ect.
1X
i=0
↵23i = 0 (4)
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We show now how this structural representation can be retrieved from the data.
Since Y follows a stationary process, it has a Vector Moving Average (VMA) repre-
sentation:
Yt = et +B1et 1 +B2et 2 + ...
var(e) = ⌃
(5)
et represents the vector of canonical-form innovations and ⌃ the corresponding
variance-covariance matrix. To convert equation (5) to the fundamental equation
(1), we need to transform the innovations et into the structural shocks "t. Let the
relation between the structural and the reduced-form innovations be linear, such that
et = C"t for some non-singular 3⇥ 3 matrix C. Comparing equations (1) and (5), we
see that A0 = C and A1 = B1C, A2 = B2C and so on, i.e. A(L) = B(L)C. Thus,
knowledge of A0 allows us to extract the structural shocks "t from the reduced-form
innovations et and subsequently all Aj.
Is A0 identified? A0 has nine elements, thus we need nine restrictions to fully
identify them. One can obtain six, using the relationship between the variance of
the structural innovations (by assumption, the identity matrix) and the estimated
reduced form variance as follows:
var(e) = ⌃) var(A0"t) = A0A00 = ⌃ (6)
The last three restrictions come from our identification restriction of a lower-
triangular long-run matrix and hence from equations (2) - (4). This means that the
matrix (
P1
i=0Bi)A0 is lower triangular. Thus we can recover the structural system
A1, A2... and the world technology shock.
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3 Data and Stationarity
Our sample consists of annual data from EU-KLEMS database from the Gronin-
gen Growth and Development Centre of the University of Groningen, for the period
1970-2007. Typically, SVAR-studies employ quarterly data but using data on an-
nual frequency has its own advantages. Firstly, data on productivity per hour are not
available (to our knowledge) at quarterly frequency for Europe and since productivity
measured in units of hours worked controls better for labour intensity; we prefer to
use this measure even at the cost of using a lower frequency sample. Second, since the
workhorse of our model, i.e. that productivities are (1  1)0 cointegrated, is expected
to hold true in the long-run or even at the steady state; lower frequency data might
be better to look at. As Strauss (1996) puts it, simple “time disaggregation” from
years to higher frequency is not likely to reveal long-run relationships. Finally, as Gi-
annone et al (2008) point out, quarterly data for Europe are not very trustworthy and
are only harmonised after 1991, questioning their use even at the gain of short-term
dynamics.
We define EA as the eleven countries that first joined the monetary union, and
are those countries used in the Are-Wide-Model (AWM) of the European Central
Bank (ECB) developed by Fagan et al (2001). These countries are Belgium, Ger-
many, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and
Finland. The main series used from the EU-KLEMS database were: “Gross Output
at Current Basic Prices (millions of Euros)” code GO, “Total Hours Worked by Per-
sons Engaged” code H-EMP, “Total Hours Worked by Employees” code H-EMPE,
number of persons engaged and employees, and “Gross Output Price Indices” code
GO-P. We also used from the “Total Database” of the Conference Board, obtained
from the same source, population levels for each country. Data were not readily
available to start directly estimations on them and had to be transformed. Details
of these transformations are available on request.Our mainstream productivity series
refers to the “persons engaged measure”, using “persons employed” does not a↵ect
our results. Hours worked per employee and hours worked per person engaged both
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exhibit a downward trend, but hours should be a stationary series by definition since
it is bounded by a physical constraint. To eliminate this problem we divided total
hours by population. Our measure for US productivity is the “Output per hour” in-
dex of the Non-farm Business sector, seasonally adjusted, available from the Bureau
of Labour Statistics. To estimate the real exchange rate we used values for the nom-
inal rate of the “synthetic euro” from Datastream, whereas as a proxy of the price
level we used data on consumer price indices. For the Euro Area, data come from
the AWM of the ECB - transformed from quarterly to annual frequency by simple
averaging3. For the US we used the annual consumer price index (US City Average,
non-seasonally adjusted) available on the Bureau of Labour Statistics web-site. Note
that the exchange rate is the value of one dollar in terms of the common European
currency - thus an increase represents real euro depreciation. More details on the
construction of the euro-dollar real exchange rate are found in Appendix A. All vari-
ables are presented and analysed in log-levels, and hence first di↵erences represent
annual growth-rates. Graphs of all the series are presented in Appendix A.
According to our specification, productivity in EA and US should be non-stationary
integrated one processes who are mutually cointegrated. Graphs of the natural loga-
rithm of both series are presented in Appendix A and both series exhibit an upward
trend (Figure 8). Further, we observe that since 1970s Europe has been constantly
more productive than the US, thus decreasing the productivity gap between the two
regions. Moreover, the graph is suggestive of the existence of a common stochas-
tic trend in the two series, similarly to Rabanal et al (2008). Also, Giannone et al
(2008) provide evidence of a common trend between EA and US by showing that the
gap between US and European GDP per capita has been more or less constant since
1970; indicative of some long-run relation in the two series4. In what follows, we show
that the assertion of a common stochastic trend can be also supported on statistical
grounds in our sample.
For each series we conducted three di↵erent types of stationarity tests: the Aug-
3Data from the AWM are up to 2005, thus the two missing years were obtained by extrapolating
the sample using annual growth rates of the HCIP index from the ECB web-site.
4Figures 6 and 7 in Giannone et al (2008) depict that constant gap pretty clearly.
9
mented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF), the Phillips-Perron test (PP) and the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS) so that we can test both the null hypothesis of a
unit root and that of stationarity. The results of these tests are presented in the
Appendix B. First, we check whether the log-productivities are integrated of order
one - I(1). For the EA, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at con-
ventional levels by the ADF test and the KPSS test rejects the null of stationarity at
1% level in favour of a random walk specification. On the other hand, the PP test
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit-root (p-value = 0.0073) against the alternative
of stationarity. The results for the corresponding US series provide even more solid
evidence for the existence of a unit root. The above, together with strong rejection
of the unit-root once the series are di↵erenced (not reported) support that the series
are indeed I(1). Therefore, we can now move on to statistical tests of cointegration
between the two series.
According to Hamilton (1994), when the cointegrating vector is known the by far
best method of checking for cointegration is to construct a series using the implied
cointegrating relationship and check that series for stationarity. Following this logic,
unit-root tests provide rather solid evidence for our intuitive belief that US and EA
exhibit a common trend (see table 5 in Appendix B). The ADF and PP tests reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level in favour of the alternative, i.e. stationarity,
with p-values equal to 2.6% and 2.2% respectively. Even though the KPSS is less
supportive of these results, rejecting stationarity at 5% in favour of a random-walk
specification, it does not do so at 1% level.
The problems about the intuitive belief of (1   1)0 cointegration come from the
Johansen tests. In particular, with one lag in fist di↵erences in the Vector Error
Correction (VEC) model, and using constants in both the cointegrating relation and
the data we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating relationships at
all levels, with both Trace and Max-Eigenvalue tests; but the null that the vector is
equal to (1 1)0 cannot be rejected. Introducing a dummy for the German unification
significantly lowers the p-value for the null hypothesis of a zero cointegrating vector
very close to 10%; while keeping the p-values of one cointegrating vector equal to
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(1   1)0 at high levels, thus improving our prior belief. Moreover, removing the
constant from the data fixes the results. In that case, both Trace and Eigenvalue
Tests reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors and cannot reject the
null of one at 5% level; therefore supporting the existence of a single cointegrating
vector (see Appendix B, Table 7). Further, the null hypothesis that that vector is
  = (1   1)0 cannot be rejected with a high p-value (0.51). The latter, combined
the outcomes of unit-root tests, the results of other studies that render productivity
di↵erentials stationary and last but not least our intuitive belief allow us to move on
with the estimation of the SVAR. Before doing so, we check the stationarity of the
real exchange rate series.
Whether the real exchange rate is a stationary process or a unit-root process is
not a conclusive issue in the empirical literature; and to some extent neither in the
theoretical one. Intuitively, the real exchange rate should be stationary by virtue of
the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Consequently, any test checking for unit roots
in real exchange rates is equivalently a test for the empirical validity of the PPP;
which it is known to be a rather contentious issue. Froot and Rogo↵ (1994) analyse a
number of studies that empirically test real exchange rates as unit-root processes and
conclude that they appear to be stationary for as long as the horizon is su ciently
long. Second, it seems that the null hypothesis of a unit-root is more di cult to
reject in the post Bretton Woods period of floating - and rather volatile - exchange
rates rather than under fixed exchange rate regimes5. Third, annual data seem to
favour more the stationarity of the real exchange rate (Strauss 1996). In our model
we impose PPP in the long-run and that no shock can have permanent e↵ect on the
real exchange rate; with o cial tests giving solid evidence to the latter. Even though
PP test confronts stationarity; the other two tests support it. Results of statistical
tests are presented in Table 6 in Appendix B. In particular, the null hypothesis of
a unit root is rejected by the ADF test at 10%, with a p-value at a bit lower than
7%, and KPSS strongly supports stationarity since the null cannot be rejected at any
5Lothian and Taylor (1994) when using only post Bretton-Woods data cannot reject the null
hypothesis of a random walk for any real exchange rate series used, but that is “easily rejected”
when the entire sample is used (more than 100 years).
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level.
However, careful inspection of the Figure 8 in Appendix A reveals two-periods
of large-scale dollar appreciation in the mid-80s and towards the end of the century
which, at least for the latest episode, have been largely attributed to higher produc-
tivity growth in US than in EA (Alquist and Chinn 2002). Additionally, one should
not forget that there can also be theoretical reasons why deviations from PPP might
be long and persistent, with the most prominent one being the renowned Balassa-
Samuelson e↵ect (attributed to Balassa 1964 and Samuelson 1964). If productivity
di↵erences play an important role in determining relative prices thus causing per-
sistent deviations from PPP, conventional unit-root tests can face real di culty in
distinguishing between a stationary but persistence process and a unit-root process.
Problems of low power in these tests are well known. Indeed, Alquist and Chinn
(2002) and Schnatz et al (2003) provide solid evidence for the existence of a Balassa-
Samuelson e↵ect in the real euro-dollar rate. Economy-wide productivity di↵erentials
“appear to have a strong impact on the dollar/euro rate”, where “each percentage
point in the US-Euro Area productivity di↵erential results in a five percentage point
appreciation of the dollar”6. The above call for the use of a slightly di↵erent type
of test, the so called Covariate Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) test developed by
Hansen (1995). This test departs from the standard univariate context of unit-root
tests (like ADF) and makes use of more variables that can potentially explain move-
ments in the variable of interest. Hansen (1995) shows that including the appropriate
covariates can result in enormous gains in power. Obviously, if productivity di↵eren-
tials is an important determinant of real exchange rate movements, and since we have
previously established its stationarity, the series makes a prime candidate to be used
as an additional explanatory variable in CADF tests. Performing the test we find that
the null hypothesis of a unit-root in the (log-) real exchange rate is rejected at 5%
level when we include the current and past value of EA-US productivity di↵erentials
in the regression, and at 1% level once we also include a future value (see Appendix
B, Table 6). Hansen (1995) stresses the importance that the included covariate(s) is
6Alquist and Chinn (2002). Schnatz et al (2003) find this number to be lower at 1.5%-2%.
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stationary, hence we also use US productivity growth to perform the test, our con-
clusions are unaltered. Thus, we can be confident that the real exchange rate - or
at least the measure we have in hand - is a stationary, albeit persistent, process and
include it in log-levels in our estimations.
Overall, stationarity and cointegration results do allow us to construct a SVAR
system as outlined in the previous section. In what follows we provide the main
results of this analysis.
4 Results from SVAR
In this section we analyse the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and the variance
decompositions of the three variables in our system. We estimated a Vector Autore-
gressive (V AR) model with p-lags in the vector of the endogenous variables and we set
p = 1 as chosen by both Akaike and Scwartz Information Criteria. Maximum Eigen-
value tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors between the
endogenous variables.
As explained above, our identification restriction asserts that only the world tech-
nology shock can permanently change US productivity. Figure 1 presents the IRF of
the level of US productivity to this disturbance. US productivity increases in response
to a permanent innovation in world technology and follows a small hump shaped be-
haviour: it increases by slightly less than 1.2% on impact, reaches a peak after seven
years (1.5%) only to decrease thereafter and restore itself to its new long-run value at
a level 1.2% higher than before the shock. Figure 2 provides the IRFs of the other two
variables to the permanent common technology shock. The world technology shock
is primarily felt in the American economy, since the di↵erentials series decreases on
impact by 0.8% before it reverts back to its long run (constant) level.
Finally, we observe that temporarily higher productivity in the US causes a real
euro depreciation. Alquist and Chinn (2002) construct an empirical model using
cointegration between the euro-dollar real exchange rate and productivity di↵erentials
growth with quarterly data over 1986-2001, to find that a one percentage point in the
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Figure 1: Accumulated IRFs of US Productivity Growth to the World Technology Shock.
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
US-EA productivity di↵erential appreciates the dollar by approximately five percent7.
Interestingly, IRFs here imply a similar result where a 0.8% decrease in the EA-US
di↵erential causes the euro to hit its lowest value (highest on the graph) at 4.0% lower
than its equilibrium level. This observed Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect is not expected in
this setting since our identification method cannot distinguish productivity levels
between sectors of tradeable and non-tradeble goods. However, Alquist and Chinn
(2002) and Schnatz et al (2003) explain that productivity improvements can generate
wealth e↵ects which, if they induce a disproportionate increase in spending on local
goods, can cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Clarida and Gali (1994)
also find a US-dollar appreciation in response to a relative supply shock. What is
more, the response is highly significant, with confidence intervals being rather narrow,
and long-lasting, since it takes approximately five years for the e↵ect to die out. This is
instructive of the role of common innovations to technology in explaining relative price
di↵erences across countries, and re-enforces the results of Alquist and Chinn (2002)
and Schantz et al (2003) as well as the theoretical insight of currency appreciation
following a productivity shock due to wealth e↵ects.
7Schnatz et al (2003) find this number to be lower at 1.5  2.0%.
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Figure 2: IRFs of log Productivity Di↵erentials and the log of the Real Exchange Rate to
the World Technology Shock. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
We now move on to the analysis of the influence of the world technology shock to
the variability of the underlying economic aggregates, as measured by its percentage
contribution to the variance of the forecast error. The results are reported in Table 1.
The biggest portion of the variability in the US productivity series in the short-run
is explained by the permanent world productivity shock; 75.8% on impact and more
than 90% at horizons of 5 years or above. Furthermore, the world technology shock
explains one-fifth of the variation in productivity di↵erences across the Atlantic at
business-cycle frequencies and one-quarter at long horizons. The significance of the
common technology innovation in explaining variations in productivity is in line with
IRBC models that find significant contribution of the common factor to business cycle
fluctuations (Canova et al 2007, Kose et al 2003, Stock and Watson 2005).
Moving on to the relative importance of the shocks to the real euro-dollar rate,
we observe that permanent technology improvements explain 15.7% of the variance
in the forecast-error on impact, and around 20% at business cycle frequencies. This
shows that permanent innovations to world technology, identified by extracting a
common stochastic trend in productivity, is an important source of fluctuations in
relative prices; despite not being the dominant one. Ahmed et al (1993) show that
a world supply shock explains 11.8% of the 32-quarters variation of the growth in
relative prices. In their identification method the world supply shock is allowed to
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permanently change both the level of output and hours, thus making it similar to
the disturbance identified in this study. Even though their findings are quantitatively
lower than ours, care should be taken in their comparison. First, Ahmed et al (1993)
use a six-variable SVAR system that allows for a much richer shock structure. Second,
the e↵ects concern the change in the real exchange rate, rather than the level, and last
but not least their results concern a measure of relative price between US and a five-
nation OECD aggregate, whereas we focus on the real euro-dollar rate. Moreover, the
share of real exchange rate movements attributed to the world technology shock stands
much higher than the supply shock identified in Clarida and Gali (1994) and the
economy-wide productivity shock identified in Lewis (2006), both standing between
0 5% at business cycle frequencies. The latter implies that indeed our identification
method that allows for open-economy dynamics via cointegration, uncovers sources
of movements largely omitted in the conventional identification of country-specific
supply or productivity shocks. However, the findings of Farrant and Peersman (2006)
mitigate the strength of this argument since, by repeating the exercise of Clarida
and Gali (1994) using sign restrictions for identification, they find that shocks to
the labour input explain between 12-28% of fluctuations in relative prices between
EA and US, a number very close to our estimation. Finally, the contribution of the
world technology shock is much lower when compared to shocks on (real) demand
and nominal shocks (Lewis 2006, Clarida and Gali 1994, Farrant and Peersman 2006,
Eichenbaum and Evans 1995). Our results do not stand in sharp contrast with these
studies since the residual variability, which constitutes the biggest portion (around
80%), is explained by shocks which can be either real or nominal in nature, but cannot
change productivity permanently. Lastrapes (1992) finds an important role of “real”
shocks to real and nominal exchange rates; ranging between 60%   90% at horizons
of 1-60 months. However, Lastrapes (1992) approach cannot disentangle neither a
supply, neither a technology nor a real demand shock. His method can only distinguish
between a “real” and a “nominal” shock and Lastrapes himself acknowledges that if
the world is subject to more than a single real shock his results can be potentially
compromised. Indeed, this is why our estimates of the e↵ect of permanent common
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innovations to technology are much lower than Lastrapes (1992).
Table 1: Variance Decomposition of the Endogenous Variables
Contribution of the World Technology Shock
Years to the variance of US Productivity (percent).
0 75.8 (27.6)
1 85.8 (27.8)
2 89.1 (26.8)
5 91.4 (22.0)
8 93.4 (16.5)
1 100.0 (1.9)
Contribution of the World Technology Shock
Years to the Variance of EA-US Productivity Di↵erentials (percent)
0 20.3 (22.9)
1 18.5 (22.0)
2 19.4 (22.5)
5 22.7 (23.6)
8 24.4 (24.0)
1 25.9 (24.5)
Contribution of the World Technology Shock
Years to the Variance of the Real Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate (percent)
0 15.7 (17.8)
1 19.8 (18.2)
2 20.6 (18.2)
5 20.3 (17.9)
8 20.1 (17.8)
12 20.2 (17.9)
1 20.4 (18.9)
Note: Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations.
Overall, our results suggest that if we are indeed identifying a “pure” technol-
ogy shock, despite it being the primal source of productivity movements in US and
very influential for productivity di↵erentials in the two regions; it fails to be the
primal source of real exchange rate variations. This provides limited support to
productivity-based models of real exchange rate determination a` la Balassa (1964)
and Samuelson (1964). These type of models instruct that in a world with tradeable
and non-tradeable goods, where the law of one price holds and under full capital mo-
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bility; only sectoral productivity di↵erentials can drive, or even cause, movements in
the real exchange rate (DeGregorio and Wolf 1994, Froot and Rogo↵ 1991, Obstfeld
1993, Rogo↵ 1992).
Despite the above, the e↵ect of world productivity disturbances is in no case neg-
ligible and can account for 15%-20% of the euro-dollar real exchange rate movements
at business cycle frequencies. Moreover, analysis of impulse responses has shown
that common changes to productivity can cause significant and persistent deviations
from PPP during the countries’ transition to the new productivity levels; even if
these changes are not concentrated on a particular sector as the Balassa-Samuelson
framework instructs. The latter reinforces theoretical explanations of the direction
of relative price movements in response to productivity shocks, as analysed and ex-
plained by Alquist and Chinn (2002), Schnatz et al (2003) and Bergstrand (1991).
Therefore, identifying world technology shocks using the one-to-one cointegrating re-
lation of country-productivities allows for the exploitation of open-economy dynamics
and international spillovers that could serve as an important source of variation over
the cycle. In that sense, our results meet with many di↵erent branches of the litera-
ture. As explained, they meet with the empirical SVAR literature on real exchange
rate movements in so far that non-permanent technology shocks constitute the main
driving force. Also, they build on the more theoretical work of Rabanal et al (2008)
and Fe`ve and Dupaigne (2009) who make use of the (1  1) cointegrating relation in
productivities in a general equilibrium framework. In particular, Rabanal et al (2008)
show that this cointegrating relation implies higher persistence and slower productiv-
ity spillovers; the open-economy dynamics mentioned above which, as they explain,
can imply more persistent and volatile exchange rates. As a result, their calibrated
two-country DSGE model that uses a bivariate VEC structure of TFPs as the ex-
ogenous driving force can match very well the variability of the real exchange rate
relative to output; compared to similar models with stationary, albeit persistent, TFP
processes (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland 1994, Heathcote and Perri 2002). In a similar
vein, Fe`ve and Dupaigne (2009) stress the importance of a common stochastic trend
in country-specific productivity series, interpreted as a “world technology shock”, on
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uncovering open-economy dynamics important for explaining country-specific cyclical
fluctuations. Last but not least, our results meet with a large number of dynamic
factor models employed in multi-country settings that find a significant contribution
of the common factor to business cycle fluctuations (Canova et al 2007, Kose et al
2003, Stock and Watson 2005).
4.1 Discussion
Interpretation of the results in this empirical work needs to be done with caution.
The real exchange rate literature has hard time to assign an important role to sup-
ply shocks in explaining movements in relative prices, even though these type of
disturbances account for 100% of the long-run variations in output. The estimated
e↵ect of world technology disturbances to real exchange rate movements, compared
to their labour-supply counterparts is suggestive that real factors, whereby real I
mean changes in underlying economic fundamentals that can permanently change
the level of output, productivity or both, can potentially be a significant - albeit not
the dominant - source of real exchange rate fluctuations. Nonetheless, non-permanent
technology shocks - let them be temporary technology shocks, nominal shocks, de-
mand shocks but as well as shocks to the labour input - appear to be the dominant
determinants of relative prices.
Finally, one should not forget that the structural disturbance we attempt to ex-
tract in this study is a common world technology shock, where by “common” we
mean a common stochastic trend in the country-specific productivity series that con-
stitutes the only source of unit root to productivity. Intuitively, a common shock
in a (two country) world where countries are symmetric and prices are fully-flexible
should not cause any movements in the exchange rate. Consequently, an RBC-type
of model would be expected to assign a very low role to a common world technology
shock in moving relative prices, even when this disturbance is the only driving force
of the cycle. For the latter, it is natural that the estimated e↵ects of country-specific
shocks are in general more relevant8 than common disturbances are. However, what
8See Ahmed et al (1993). We also identify country-specific technology shocks by relaxing cointe-
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we claim to identify here is an additional source of movements, largely omitted so
far in the literature. A common technology disturbance can cause variations in the
relative price of goods across two regions for one of two reasons. First, because coun-
tries are not symmetric and absorb technology di↵erently9 and second because there
are frictions in the world economy causing prices not to adjust fully - at least not
instantly. The latter e↵ect though would be expected to dissipate in the long-run
where prices are fully flexible. Therefore, the small reaction of the real exchange rate
to the shock might be due to the fact that US and EA are able to absorb technologi-
cal innovations in a similar manner and speed; rather than a weak relation between
productivity and exchange rates. If that holds true, we should expect to observe a
significant contribution of country-specific, temporary technological disturbances to
the forecast error variance but this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Robustness
In this section we evaluate the robustness of our results to di↵erent modifications.
In particular, we check the sensitivity to changing the first variable of the system to
the EA productivity growth, to adding another endogenous variable in the system,
to the definition of price and hence the real exchange rate, to changing the frequency
of the data and finally to relaxing the cointegration assumption. Overall, our results
are robust in the sense that the findings for the contribution to variance are similar,
if not higher, under di↵erent specifications with the exception being when we allow
for permanent e↵ects to the real exchange rate with quarterly data. From now on
whenever the benchmark case is referred to, we mean the SVAR system analysed in
the previous section.
gration as part of our robustness checks.
9Note that when assuming (1 1) cointegrated productivities we are assuming that the countries
are indeed symmetric at the steady-state.
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5.1 EA Productivity Growth
In this first robustness test, we check whether our results change when we include EA
productivity growth instead of US as the first variable. If we are indeed identifying a
common productivity shock the results should not be altered dramatically. Also, Fer-
nald (2007) shows that impulse responses in VAR systems with long-run restrictions
can be quite sensitive to low-frequency correlations that need not be causal. Thus, to
the extend that non-causal low-frequency correlations between the two productivity-
growth series and the exchange rate are di↵erent, we might expect to get di↵erent
results. If, however, this statistical feature with no economic value does not influence
much the impulses (and hence the contributions to variance) the results should not
be very di↵erent under the two specifications.
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Figure 3: Accumulated IRFs of EA and US Productivity Growth to the World Technology
Shock. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
The response of EA productivity growth is instructive about the commonality
of the shock; as representing a common stochastic trend in the productivity series.
The impulse causes a positive and significant impact e↵ect on EA productivity (figure
3) increasing it by 0.55%. Thereafter, the series increases monotonically until it is
restored to its new long-run level approximately 1.2% higher than before the shock;
matching exactly the permanent increase on US productivity (by construction).
Table 2 provides a summary of results on variance decompositions under di↵erent
21
attempts. For this case - Panel B, point 1 of the table - we observe that the contribu-
tion of worldwide technological innovations at short horizons are much less influential
in Europe than in the US (24.4% up to one year compared to 85% in the US at the
same horizon) but are still quite significant. This implies that indeed US drives the
world business cycle - a result found in Giannone et al (2008) - or that Europe is
more a↵ected by domestic disturbances.
Finally, the contributions to the real exchange rate are in general higher - see
panel A of table 2 under specification 1. On impact, the world technology shock
contributes 27.8% and 26.2% in twelve years. This is a bit di↵erent than in the
benchmark case but shows that the potential e↵ect of common permanent technology
shocks to relative prices can be more than 25%. This discrepancy, albeit not being
destructive raises some warning flags. In view of the latter, we thereafter check the
stability of our results to a 4-variables SVAR system.
5.2 Four Variables
We include the “short-term interest rates di↵erential” as an additional variable to
our initial specification since this can possibly capture di↵erences in monetary policy
behaviour across the two regions. Clarida and Gali (1994), Farrant and Peersmann
(2006) and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) have shown that monetary policy shocks are
very influential to real exchange rate movements. Further, interest rate di↵erentials
have a theoretical appeal in exchange rate determination (Frankel J. 1979).
We consider short-term interest rate di↵erentials between US and Germany, in-
stead of using some aggregate measure for Europe. The reason for doing so is twofold.
First, common monetary policy for Europe does not exist before 1999, thus if we want
to capture relative monetary policy shocks some aggregate measure of the interest rate
would not make much sense. Second, Germany has always been a dominant coun-
try for fighting inflation in Europe. Clarida et al (1998) document that Bundesbank
played a very influential role on monetary arrangements” within France, Italy and
England. Also, it seems that these countries were following very closely German mon-
etary policy even before the “hard ERM” period, as defined by the authors to be the
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Table 2: Variance Decomposition Under Di↵erent Specifications
Panel A: Contribution of the World Technology Shock
to the Variance of the Real Exchange Rate (percent)1
Specification 0 1 5 12
1. EA Growth 27.8 28.6 26.9 26.2
(18.9) (18.6) (18.1) (18.1)
2. Four Variables 17.9 20.1 17.1 16.8
(23.9) (24.6) (24.1) (19.5)
3. Price of GDP RER 20.4 23.8 25.5 25.5
(19.1) (19.4) (19.7) (19.8)
4. Quarterly data - RER first-di↵ 0.9 0.3 0.6 1.9
(3.3) (3.3) (4.2) (6.6)
5. Quarterly data - RER in levels 8.6 10.8 13.7 11.9
(14.3) (15.2) (15.5) (14.6)
Panel B: Contribution of the World
Technology Shock to other selected Variables
Variable 0 1 5 12
1. EA productivity 23.5 24.4 46.0 90.3
(30.5) (31.3) (26.8) (12.2)
2. US productivity under 4 variables 65.8 81.4 85.1 94.3
(23.8) (27.8) (23.8) (11.2)
Panel C: Country Specific Permanent Shocks
- No Cointegration
Shock 0 1 5 12
US shock on RER 61.8 65.5 66.8 66.7
(27.8) (27.1) (27.3) (27.4)
EA shock on RER 45.9 45.5 46.4 46.6
(27.7) (26.7) (26.5) (26.6)
Note: Panel A: Specification one corresponds to the SVAR system where the first endogenous variable is Euro-
Area productivity growth. Specification two corresponds to an SVAR system of 4 endogenous variables where the
additional variable is interest-rate di↵erentials, specification three to the estimation where the exchange rate was
GDP-deflated and specifications four and five correspond to estimations using quarterly data. Under specification
four, the real exchange rate was included in first-di↵erences in the estimation and one lag was used whereas in
case five the real exchange rate was included in levels and four lags were used. For specifications four and five
the horizon is quarters, not years.
Panel B: The first line refers to the contribution of the world technology shock to EA productivity and the second
to the contribution of the shock to US productivity in the four-variable SVAR.
Panel C: E↵ects of country-specific technology shocks on the real exchange rate when cointegration is relaxed.
Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations.
years between 1990  92 (Clarida et al 1998).
Following Eichanbaum and Evans (1995) and Faust and Rogers (2003) we proxy
the short term interest rates using the “Federal Reserve Overnight E↵ective Rate”
for US and the “Money Market Frankfurt Banks Overnight Rate” for Germany; both
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at annual frequency10. The di↵erentials series is stationary11 and is included in levels
in our system. Note also that we use Germany-US thus an increase in the series
represents a contractionary monetary policy shock in the EA. We also check with a
lower frequency measure of the short term interest rates across the Atlantic, namely
the equivalent to the 3-Months rates to the above, again transformed at annual fre-
quencies. Results (not reported) are not significantly di↵erent.
Figure 4 presents the response functions of the interest rate di↵erential and the
log-level real exchange rate to the world technology shock; for the sake of brevity
we omit the dynamic responses of the other two variables. Overall, the responses
maintain the same sign but we observe some minor di↵erences in the magnitude
when compared to the initial specification.
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Figure 4: IRFs of Interest Rate Di↵erentials and Euro-Dollar Real Exchange Rate to the
World Technology Shock. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
The e↵ects of a world technology shock in explaining movements in real exchange
rate are very similar compared to the benchmark case (see Table 2 - Panel A under
specification 2). On impact,the contribution to real exchange rate movements is in-
creased slightly, at 17.9% compared to 15.7% initially found and at business cycle
frequencies the e↵ect is close to 20% as in the initial specification. Hence, our con-
clusions are robust to the addition of interest rate di↵erentials as an additional and
10Our indicator for Germany is a bit di↵erent than these authors
11ADF test rejects unit root at 5% level.
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potentially significant variable for explaining movements in exchange rates.
5.3 Di↵erent Measure for the exchange rate
In this section, we retain the exact same specifications for the first two endogenous
variables of our system as in the benchmark case, but we use a di↵erent measure of
the real exchange rate. Using di↵erent price indicators to construct the exchange rate
can be important especially if there are significant di↵erences in their composition
of traded and non-traded goods (Bets and Kehoe 2006). With that in mind, we use
the “Price of GDP” from the same sources - the AWM of the ECB expanded for the
missing years for the EA and data from the BLS for the US. Figure 5 which plots
both exchange rate series depicts some discrepancies at the beginning and the end of
our sample. Stationarity results are still quite solid as in the benchmark case, with a
p-value for the ADF test being 0.02.
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Figure 5: Log real exchange rate, GDP deflated (dashed line) and HCIP deflated (solid
line)
IRFs are very similar so they are not analysed in detail for the sake of brevity.
On variance decompositions, the contribution of the world technology shock on the
real euro-dollar rate is elevated by almost 5% at all horizons (see Table 2, Panel
A under specification 3). Thus, this test retains robustness while allowing for the
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possibility that permanent technology disturbances are a bit more important than
initially estimated.
5.4 Quarterly Data
A natural criticism for our study is that we do not use data at quarterly frequency,
something that can be at least partly justified by better quality of annual data.
Nevertheless, in this section we check for the robustness of our results to the use of
higher frequency data, at the cost of lower quality. In particular, this involves using
productivity per person instead of the preferred measure of productivity per hour.
Our sample period is 1970Q1 - 2000Q4. Over this period, and with quarterly data, the
euro-dollar real exchange rate is found to be non-stationary12 and at a first attempt
it is included in first-di↵erences in our SVAR. Many things are worth mentioning
out of this analysis. First, we observe that the e↵ect of the world technology shock
on the real euro-dollar rate is negative and significant, albeit short-lived, implying
a dollar depreciation (see figure 6). This stands in contrast to the corresponding
response in the benchmark case, but as well as to evidence of a Balassa-Samuelson
e↵ect on the euro-dollar rate documented in the literature (Alquist and Chinn 2002,
Schnatz et al 2003). Second, our results are not immune to these kind of changes, with
the contribution of the world technology shock to the variability of the log-level real
euro-dollar rate standing between 0.9%-3.4% (Table 2, Panel A, Specification 4) at
horizons between one to twenty quarters (five years); much lower than the benchmark
case.However, there is a problem of identification under this specification: the world
technology shock identified with quarterly data and the real exchange rate in first
di↵erences is e↵ectively a US-specific technology shock. That is, if we extract such
an innovation by relaxing cointegration, the correlation between the two is almost
perfect standing at 0.997(!)13 .
Nevertheless, the discrepancy decreases a great deal once we abstract from a
12ADF tests give a high p-value, 41%. There are evidence that real exchange rates have been more
volatile and exhibit a unit-root in the post Bretton Woods period, see for example Clarida and Gali
(1994). A graph of the real exchange rate series at quarterly frequency is given in Appendix A.
13We analyse the case where we relax cointegration in more detail in the following section.
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Figure 6: IRFs of the endogenous variables to the World Technology Shock, quarterly data.
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
unit-root in the real exchange rate even at quarterly frequency14. Specifically, the
contribution of the shock to real exchange rate variance is higher ranging between
8.6% on impact, 11.4% at twenty quarters (five years) and 15.3% in the long-run15
(Table 2, Panel A, Specification 5). Compared to the benchmark case the contribution
is still lower but not vastly di↵erent. Importantly, the correlation between this shock
and a US-specific one is much lower than before, with a correlation coe cient equal
to 0.70, and significantly di↵erent from one16.
Overall, we can derive one conclusion out of this exercise: our results are not very
sensitive to the use of quarterly or annual data to extract the world technology shock,
but we cannot say the same thing about how the real exchange rate is specified.
If we assume the real exchange rate as an I(1) process, we find that the e↵ect of
common shocks to technology are not important for relative prices across the Atlantic.
However, if the real exchange rate is I(0), their contribution is in no case negligible
but a bit lower than in our benchmark specification.
14Note that even though this might not be common practice, CADF tests do provide some evidence
of stationarity over our sample period.
15We estimated the VAR with 4 lags in order to “absorb” some of the persistence in the level of
the real exchange rate.
16We bootstrapped 1000 random samples of correlations, to derive standard errors in order to
test the null hypothesis that the correlation between the two shocks is perfect. The latter is easily
rejected, with a t-value equal to  178.74.
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5.5 Relaxing Cointegration
In this section, we relax the assumption of cointegrated productivities, thus allow-
ing for the possibility of permanent, country-specific technological innovations and
consequent productivity improvements. The SVAR system is estimated by using pro-
ductivity growth of US and EA (log-first-di↵erences) and the real exchange rate in
levels:
0BBB@
 XUSt
 XEAt
qt
1CCCA = C(L)⇥
0BBB@
✏USt
✏2t
✏3t
1CCCA
with:
C(1) =
0BBB@
c11 0 0
c21 c22 0
c31 c32 c33
1CCCA
Xt is labour productivity,   is the di↵erence operator and q is the real euro-dollar
rate, all expressed in logs. The first structural disturbance can be identified as a
US-specific technology shock, since it is the only shock that can permanently change
the level of US labour productivity, whereas ✏3t can be identified as a “non-technology
shock”, since it constitutes the only disturbance in this empirical economy that cannot
permanently change the level of either US or EA productivity. However, identification
of the second disturbance is not clear. We could label ✏2t as a EA-specific technology
shock that does not spill-over to the US, consistent with evidence that spillovers
originate in the US (Giannnone et al 2008), but its e↵ects can be blurred by the
influence of ✏USt . For this reason, we do not label this shock. The IRFs from this
exercise are presented in figure 7. As found in many parts in the literature, we also
obtain a significant dollar-appreciation following a US-specific shock.
The results of this exercise are pretty interesting. First, we observe that the
correlation of the two technology shocks, the US-specific shock extracted from this
system and the world technology shock, is positive with a correlation coe cient equal
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to 0.79517. This supports the idea that innovations to world technology, represented
as a common stochastic trend in country-specific productivity, include a prominent
US component. Moreover, it supports the purpose of this paper as identifying an
additional source of movements so far largely omitted in the literature; since the
correlation is far from being perfect18. Secondly, the results point that US-specific
technology shocks account for the bulk of the movements in the real euro-dollar
rate, contributing around two-thirds to its variability at business-cycle frequencies
(Table 2, Panel C, “US Shock on RER”). A EA-specific shock identified in a similar
manner, that is estimating the system as above but with the EA being the first
variable in the Choleski ordering and US the second, has lower but still important
contribution to exchange rate variability ranging around 45-47% at all horizons19.
This is interesting since technology shocks seem to be very important for explaining
real exchange rate movements, supporting the RBC paradigm and productivity-based
models of the real exchange rate. Also, US-specific technology shocks alone are the
dominant driving force of relative price movements, counter to the studies of Clarida
and Gali (1994), Farrant and Peersman (2006) and others who support that demand
shocks or nominal shocks play a dominant role. The reader should notice that under
our identification method, the third shock “nests” all those shocks that do not change
productivity, including permanent shocks to the labour input, demand or nominal
shocks and shocks to government purchases. In our estimation this shock contributes
to around one-fifth of movements in relative prices at all horizons. Finally, own-
country technology shocks have a higher e↵ect than the world technology shock, a
result that is not surprising based on the fact that the commonality of innovations to
world technology causes more symmetric responses of prices in the two countries and
17Correlation is 0.234 if we identify a EA-specific technology shock in a similar manner.
18We bootstrapped 1000 random samples of correlations, to derive standard errors in order to
test the null hypothesis that the correlation between the two shocks is perfect. The latter is easily
rejected, with a t-value equal to  95.56.
19See Table 2, Panel C, “EA shock on RER”. Note also that a second endogenous variable is
not necessary for identifying a country-specific technology shock, that is we could have obtained
the same innovation from a bivariate system ( XUSt q)
0 and impose Blanchard and Quah (1989).
Applying the latter leaves the e↵ect of permanent, country-specific technological innovations to the
real exchange rate unchanged.
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consequently a less variable response of the real exchange rate.
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Figure 7: IRFs of the endogenous variables to a US-specific Technology Shock. Dashed
lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
However, there are some issues in the estimation of the previous model worth
discussing, and the main issue comes from the fact that when using quarterly data,
and more specifically including the growth in the real exchange rate in our SVAR;
improvements to productivity do not seem to play such an important role. Again,
using the sample 1970Q1-2000Q4 the e↵ect of US-specific technological innovations
on the real exchange rate ranges only from 0.8%   1.3% at all horizons. Yet again,
the long-run matrix estimated out of quarterly data again points to “non-technology
shocks” as the sources of a unit root in the real euro-dollar rate, providing more sup-
port to the results of Clarida and Gali (1994) and their followers, as well as to models
that emphasise the role of non-technology shocks, let them be real (shocks to govern-
ment purchases, labour input, real demand) or nominal (monetary shocks). This is
not counter-intuitive since, as emphasised earlier, the definition of “non-technology”
shocks nests many types of structural disturbances many of which are real in nature
and can cause permanent changes to output. The latter is recognised by Clarida and
Gali (1994) themselves who acknowledge that “real shocks to supply and demand
account for more than 50% of the variance in forecasting real exchange rates”.
However, the aforementioned results can be totally reversed once we assume that
the real exchange rate is a stationary process, as instructed by the theory of Pur-
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chasing Power Parity that is employed by many models of the business cycle in open
economies. This involves estimating a SVAR using ( XUSt  X
EA
t qt)‘ with quarterly
data to extract the shocks. In that case, the US-specific technology shocks account
for the bulk of the movements in the real euro-dollar rate, contributing 46.8% of the
variability in the same-quarter forecast error and between 60%-67% at horizons be-
tween 5-32 quarters20; numbers that are not so di↵erent from the annual frequency
results.
Overall, this section shows that if the world is characterised by technology im-
provements that are country-specific, their contribution on the variance of the fore-
cast error in the real exchange rate is potentially higher than a common stochastic
trend in productivity. Moreover, it can possibly constitute the dominant source of
fluctuations in relative prices at business cycle frequencies. However, as was the case
in the previous sub-section, the importance of country technological innovations in
explaining movements in real exchange rates is not sensitive to the use of quarterly
data as such but rather to the specification of the real exchange rate series.
6 Conclusions
This paper adds to the empirical SVAR literature which looks for the underlying
economic disturbances that are the prime sources behind real exchange rate fluctua-
tions, sparked primarily by the seminal paper of Clarida and Gali (1994). Prominent
examples include Farrant and Peersman (2006), Ahmed et al (1993), Lewis (2006);
as well as some earlier work by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Lastrapes (1992).
We add to this list a consideration of an additional source of movements, namely
a common stochastic trend in productivity interpreted as a world technology shock.
In other words, we assume that productivities are one-to-one cointegrated; an as-
sumption that is verified in the data using statistical methods. Our work is inspired
by Rabanal et al (2008) and Dupaigne and Fe`ve (2009) who have stressed the im-
portance of this common trend in uncovering open-economy dynamics significant for
20Using 4-lags in the reduced-form VAR to absorb some of the exchange rate persistence.
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cyclical movements in relative prices; as well as other macroeconomic aggregates. We
also claim that this method of identifying permanent changes in technology is more
immune to stationary country-specific shocks.
We find that the dollar appreciates significantly in real terms in response to the
shock, suggestive of the importance of productivity di↵erentials in explaining move-
ments in relative prices. The contribution of the world technology shock to the
variance of the forecast error in the real euro-dollar rate stands around 20% at busi-
ness cycle frequencies. This does not contrast the existing literature that finds that
demand or nominal shocks constitute the prime source of real exchange rate move-
ments and provides limited support to productivity-based models of real exchange
rate determination. However, even though common innovations to technology fail to
be a dominant source of swings in real exchange rates, their e↵ect is in no case negli-
gible. Future work should shed more light on the relation between technology shocks
and real exchange rates, as well as the proper identification of these innovations in
SVARs. Obviously, clearer evidence on the latter will help in answering the former.
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7 Appendix A
Real Exchange Rate: The series of the euro-dollar real exchange rate was constructed
using values of the nominal “synthetic” euro, provided by Datastream and consumer
prices indices from the AWM for the Euro Area and the Bureu of Labour statistics
or the US. The AWM Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HCIP) provides aggregate
price data for eleven European countries at quarterly frequency, seasonally adjusted.
The series was converted to annual frequency by simple averaging of the quarterly
data. The US price series used concerns US-city average HCIP data, non-seasonally
adjusted. The base of the real exchange rate index are the years 1982-84. GDP
deflated real exchange rate used price series from the same sources.
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Figure 8: Log-US Productivity (solid line) and log-EA Productivity (dashed line).
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Figure 9: Data - Log Real Exchange Rate
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Figure 10: Data - Log Real Exchange Rate, quarterly frequency
8 Appendix B
Table 3: Stationarity Tests for the log EA Productivity
Test
ADF1 Phillips Perron2 KPSS3
Null Series Series Series
Hypothesis: has a unit root has a unit root is Stationary
t-Statistic -2.560381 0.469001 0.749793
Test Critical value
1% -3.626784 -3.621023 0.739000
5% -2.945842 -2.943427 0.463000
10% -2.611531 -2.610263 0.347000
p-value 0.1104 0.0073 -
Tests include an intercept. 1One lag in first-di↵erences.
2,3PP and KPSS bandwidth were set to 2 and 5 respectively, as per the Newey-West bandwidth.
Table 4: Stationarity Tests for the log US Productivity
Test
ADF1 Phillips Perron2 KPSS3
Null Series Series Series
Hypothesis: has a unit root has a unit root is Stationary
t-Statistic 1.142251 0.837019 0.738955
Test Critical value
1% -3.626784 -3.621023 0.739000
5% -2.945842 -2.943427 0.463000
10% -2.611531 -2.610263 0.347000
p-value 0.9971 0.9934 -
Tests include an intercept. 1One lag in first-di↵erences.
2,3PP and KPSS bandwidth were set to 0 and 5 respectively, as per the Newey-West bandwidth.
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Table 5: Stationarity Tests for the EA-US log Productivity Di↵erentials
Test
ADF1 Phillips Perron2 KPSS3
Null Series Series Series
Hypothesis: has a unit root has a unit root is Stationary
t-Statistic -3.235975 -3.300347 0.655865
Test Critical value
1% -3.626784 -3.621023 0.739000
5% -2.945842 -2.943427 0.463000
10% -2.611531 -2.610263 0.347000
p-value 0.0259 0.0221 -
Tests include an intercept. 1One lag in first-di↵erences.
2,3PP and KPSS bandwidth were set to 3 and 5 respectively, as per the Newey-West bandwidth.
Table 6: Stationarity Tests for the log Euro-Dollar Real Exchange Rate
Test
ADF1 Phillips Perron2 KPSS3
Null Series Series Series
Hypothesis: has a unit root has a unit root is Stationary
t-Statistic -2.797551 -2.200538 0.330870
Test Critical value
1% -3.626784 -3.621023 0.739000
5% -2.945842 -2.943427 0.463000
10% -2.611531 -2.610263 0.347000
p-value 0.0686 0.2095 -
CADF Tests4
Covariate Lags Leads P-value
Productivity di↵erentials 1 0 0.0148
Productivity di↵erentials 1 1 0.0066
US Productivity Growth 1 0 0.0487
US Productivity Growth 1 1 0.0133
Tests include an intercept. 1One lag in first-di↵erences.
2,3PP and KPSS bandwidth were set to 3 and 4 respectively, as per the Newey-West bandwidth.
4CADF Tests include one lag of the real exchange rate in first di↵erences.
Table 7: Cointegration Tests for EA-US Productivities
Tests’ P-Values
Number of Max
cointegrating vectors Trace Eigenvalue
0 0.0103 0.0332
1 0.0832 0.0832
Restriction:   = (1  1)0
Number of
cointegrating vectors P- Value
1 0.510002
Tests include a constant term in the cointegrating vector but no deterministic
trend in the data. We used one lag in first di↵erences.
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